

BACKGROUND GUIDE



ODM MODEL UNITED NATION 2025

Message from the Executive Board

Prospective Delegates,

Considering the nature of the conference, we look forward to making this more of a learning engagement while still keeping up the spirit of competition and the essence of debate. To meet such ends, we shall be formulating UNA–USA Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business which shall be explained to you in brief prior to the first session as well as throughout the working of the committee, as and when required. We expect the debate to comprise of substantive points, logical analysis of facts and suggestions and advancement of country opinion.

To clear any contentions, the participants need not let thoughts about our expectations be a hurdle in their research or give way to any fear regarding fulfilment of their objectives. The only thing the Executive Board will put strong emphasis on, would be helping you understand the international analysis, and argumentative debating. Participants shall be tested on their knowledge and arguments, along their specific country lines and the respective ideology, over the various topics discussed in the debate and also the deliberations before choosing a particular topic.

This guide, although very comprehensive and factual, provides a basic idea of the topics likely to be argued upon and topics to be discussed in view of the committee and may vary from those of the respective delegate's ideologies. In no way is this guide to confine a participant's research. The guide consists of subjective and factual data with arguments, but this is just to make the participants understand the ways in which they must make their addresses.

We are very pleased to welcome you to the simulation of the UNGA SOCHUM at ODM Model United Nations 2025. Please take a note that the study guide is in no way exhaustive and is only to provide you with enough background information to begin your research. We would like you to do a good amount of research beyond what is covered in the guide. Relevant links have been added in the guide to help you research and further your knowledge on the agenda. In no way can the study guide be used as the sole source of information for your research. A few basic ideas have been enshrined in the guide on which you are required to research extensively and prepare. We would like to see the highest standards of diplomacy from you when you represent your nation. It is always advisable to go through the basic rules of procedures before attending the conference. However we shall be briefing you about the same on the first day of committee. We hope to see you soon.

If you have any doubts you are free to contact us via e-mail or WhatsApp. We shall be pleased to help you.

Research well!

Subhrakant Biswal (Chairperson)

Purbi Mahapatra (Vice Chairperson)

Proof/Evidence in Council

Evidence or proof is acceptable from sources:

1. News Sources:

- a. REUTERS – Any Reuters article which clearly makes mention of the fact or is in contradiction of the fact being stated by a delegate in council. (<http://www.reuters.com/>)
- b. State operated News Agencies – These reports can be used in the support of or against the State that owns the News Agency. These reports, if credible or substantial enough, can be used in support of or against any Country as such but in that situation, they can be denied by any other country in the council. Some examples are,
 - i. RIA Novosti (Russia) <http://en.rian.ru/>
 - ii. IRNA (Iran) <http://www.irna.ir/ENIndex.htm>
 - iii. BBC (United Kingdom) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/>
 - iv. Xinhua News Agency and CCTV (P.R. China) <http://cctvnews.cntv.cn/>

2. Government Reports: These reports can be used in a similar way as the State Operated News Agencies reports and can, in all circumstances, be denied by another country. However, a nuance is that a report that is being denied by a certain country can still be accepted by the Executive Board as credible information. Examples are,

- i. Government Websites like the State Department of the United States of America <http://www.state.gov/index.htm> or the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation <http://www.eng.mil.ru/en/index.html>
- ii. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of various nations like India (<http://www.mea.gov.in/>), People's Republic of China (<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/>), France (<http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/>), Russian Federation (http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/main_eng/)
- iii. Permanent Representatives to the United Nations Reports <http://www.un.org/en/members/> (Click on any country to get the website of the Office of its Permanent Representative).
- iv. Multilateral Organisations like the NATO (<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm>), ASEAN (<http://www.aseansec.org/>), OPEC (http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/), etc.

3. UN Reports: All UN Reports are considered are credible information or evidence for the Executive Board of the Security Council.

- i. UN Bodies: SOCHUM (<https://www.un.org/en/ga/third/>) etc.

- ii. UN Affiliated bodies like the International Atomic Energy Agency (<http://www.iaea.org/>), World Bank (<http://www.worldbank.org/>), International Monetary Fund (<http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm>), International Committee of the Red Cross (<http://www.icrc.org/eng/index.jsp>), etc.
- iii. Treaty Based Bodies like the Antarctic Treaty System !

NOTE:

Under no circumstances will sources like Wikipedia (<http://www.wikipedia.org/>), Amnesty International (<http://www.amnesty.org/>), Human Rights Watch(<http://www.hrw.org/>) or newspapers like the Guardian (<http://www.guardian.co.uk/>), Times of India (<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/>), etc. be accepted.

Agenda: Combating the Global Surge in Online Hate Speech and Disinformation as a Threat to Human Rights

The information provided below will focus entirely on the agenda. While SOCHUM as a committee covers a wide range of diverse topics, our discussion will remain centered on the agenda at hand.

Committee Overview:

The **United Nations General Assembly Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian & Cultural – SOCHUM)** addresses issues related to **human rights, social development, and humanitarian affairs**. Key responsibilities include:

- Promoting **fundamental freedoms** and **equality**.
- Addressing **emerging digital threats** to human rights.
- Advancing resolutions on **hate speech, disinformation, and cyber-violence**.

Mandate of SOCHUM:

- The UN Charter (particularly Articles 1, 13, and 55) : (<https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text>)
- The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948): (<https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights>)
- Key human rights treaties (ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW, etc.).

ICCPR: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (<https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights>)

ICESR: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(<https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-economic-social-and-cultural-rights>)

CEDAW: The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(<https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/>)

.And many more !!

Agenda Overview :

The rise of online hate speech and disinformation poses a serious threat to fundamental human rights, including freedom of expression, equality, and the right to dignity. In an increasingly digital world, malicious content spreads rapidly across platforms, fueling violence, discrimination, and social polarization. The Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee (SOCHUM) recognizes the urgent need for international cooperation to counter these challenges. This involves not only strengthening regulatory frameworks and platform accountability but also promoting digital literacy, safeguarding journalistic integrity, and ensuring that efforts to curb harmful content do not infringe upon legitimate freedom of speech. A balanced, rights-based approach is essential to protect individuals and preserve democratic values in the digital age.

Key Terms:

- Online Hate Speech: Harmful, discriminatory, or violent language targeting individuals/groups based on race, religion, gender, etc.
- Disinformation: Deliberately false information spread to mislead or cause harm.
- Human Rights Impact: Undermines freedom of expression, right to privacy, and social stability.

Online hate speech and disinformation are escalating crises with real-world consequences:

- Violence & Discrimination: Fueled by xenophobic/racist rhetoric (e.g., Rohingya genocide, Christchurch shooting).
- Democratic Erosion: Disinformation manipulates elections (e.g., 2016 U.S. election, Brazil 2022).
- Targeted Harm: Women, minorities, and journalists face doxxing, harassment, and death threats.

SOCHUM's Role: As the UN's human rights guardian, it addresses:

- Legal gaps in regulating digital spaces.
- Balancing free speech (Article 19, ICCPR) with preventing harm.
- Holding tech companies accountable under international law.

Agenda In Depth:

Case Study 1 : Facebook's Algorithmic Amplification in the Rohingya Genocide (Myanmar, 2017-2018)

What Happened ?

- *Military officials created fake accounts and pages spreading:*
 - *Dehumanising rhetoric (calling Rohingya "vermin" and "terrorists")*
 - *False claims about Rohingya burning their own villages*
 - *Calls for violent expulsion*
- *Example: A viral post showed a murdered woman falsely attributed to Rohingya, leading to retaliatory killings*

Key Issues Identified:

‘The cases reveal systemic failures in platform governance, with algorithmic harm emerging as a critical concern as engagement-based algorithms actively rewarded extreme content with wider reach while lacking "circuit breakers" to mitigate harm in conflict zones. Equally problematic were moderation gaps, where platforms operated with severe shortages of linguistic and cultural expertise, coupled with an over-reliance on user reporting mechanisms that proved inadequate in high-risk areas.

These deficiencies were compounded by legal accountability vacuums, where platforms exploited jurisdictional ambiguities and immunity protections to avoid responsibility, alongside reactive (rather than proactive) policies that only addressed crises after irreversible damage had occurred. Furthermore, the absence of standardized cross-platform coordination and globally consistent regulations allowed harmful content to exploit policy disparities across regions, while emerging threats like AI-generated disinformation exposed new vulnerabilities in detection and response systems.

Underlying all cases was the fundamental tension between free expression principles and preventative intervention, with platforms consistently erring on the side of inaction until forced by public outcry or regulatory pressure.

However, based on the example from the case study above, you are expected to identify solutions and address the existing loopholes.

Case Study 2 : Deepfake Election Interference in Slovakia (2023)

What Happened ?

- Two days before September 2023 elections, AI-generated audio circulated showing:
 - Fake conversation between Šimečka and a journalist
 - Falsely discussed rigging elections and raising beer prices
- First appeared on Telegram, then spread to TikTok

Key Issues Identified:

The Slovakia deepfake incident laid bare fundamental weaknesses in the global capacity to detect and mitigate AI-generated disinformation. The 48-hour verification window—while relatively fast by conventional fact-checking standards—proved catastrophically slow in the context of a rapidly unfolding election campaign, demonstrating how detection latency itself becomes an exploitable vulnerability. This challenge is exacerbated by the fragmented technological landscape, where the lack of standardized detection protocols across platforms forces fact-checkers to develop bespoke solutions for each medium (TikTok's synthetic content detectors, Telegram's encryption barriers, etc.), creating inconsistent enforcement.

These technical shortcomings intersect dangerously with underdeveloped legal frameworks. Slovakia's absence of deepfake disclosure laws at the time created a permissive environment for computational propaganda, while platforms' invocation of encryption as a barrier to pre-screening revealed a fundamental mismatch between privacy infrastructures and democratic safeguards. The incident particularly highlighted the weaponization of temporal vulnerabilities—attackers deliberately timed the deepfake's release during the legislatively mandated election "blackout period," exploiting both the candidates' legally enforced silence and voters' last-minute decision-making psychology. This case study illustrates a broader paradigm: malicious actors now employ a "disinformation kill chain" combining technical evasion (AI-generated content bypassing detectors), legal arbitrage (operating in jurisdictions with weak digital governance), and temporal precision (timing attacks to maximize impact while minimizing accountability). The consequences extend beyond Slovakia, revealing systemic risks to electoral integrity wherever these three vulnerabilities converge. Effective countermeasures must therefore integrate real-time detection AI with cross-platform certification standards, while legal reforms should mandate "pre-bunking" mechanisms during critical democratic windows—transforming detection from a reactive scramble into a structured defense protocol.

However, based on the example from the case study above, you are expected to identify solutions and address the existing loopholes.

Past resolutions :

The central idea behind these UN resolutions is to promote a peaceful, inclusive, and rights-based digital and social environment by fostering interreligious and intercultural dialogue, countering disinformation, and upholding freedom of opinion and expression. They emphasize the importance of accurate information, respectful communication, and protecting vulnerable groups—especially children—in the digital space. As delegates in SOCHUM, our objective is not to merely reiterate these frameworks, but to identify and address the gaps in their implementation. Whether it's the lack of enforcement, insufficient digital safeguards, or imbalanced censorship practices, we are here to fix the loopholes and propose stronger, actionable solutions that uphold human rights in the face of rising online hate and disinformation.

Drawing from key UN General Assembly resolutions, the global fight against online hate speech and disinformation is deeply rooted in the promotion of dialogue, peace, and human rights. Resolution 73/179 emphasizes the importance of interreligious and intercultural dialogue to foster mutual understanding and tolerance, while Resolution 74/154 directly tackles disinformation, recognizing its potential to undermine human rights and democratic institutions. Resolution 76/227 calls for a culture of peace, encouraging inclusive digital spaces free from violence and hostility. Meanwhile, Resolution 72/175 upholds the freedom of opinion and expression as a cornerstone of any rights-based society, and Resolution 75/282 stresses the need to protect children in the digital environment from harmful content and manipulation. As members of SOCHUM, our responsibility is not only to build upon these frameworks but to identify and address their existing loopholes — whether it's weak enforcement, lack of global cooperation, or insufficient accountability mechanisms — and propose comprehensive, forward-looking solutions that protect human dignity in the digital age.

Resolution 73/179 (2018): "Promoting Inter religious and Intercultural Dialogue"

Resolution 74/154 (2019): "Countering Disinformation for the Promotion of Human Rights"

Resolution 76/227 (2021): "Promoting a Culture of Peace"

Resolution 72/175 (2017): "Freedom of Opinion and Expression"

Resolution 75/282 (2020): "Rights of the Child in the Digital Environment"

Visit [UN Digital Library](#) for more resolutions !

Conclusion: A Call for Coordinated Global Action

The global surge in online hate speech and disinformation poses a grave threat to human rights, democratic institutions, and social cohesion. It forces us to ask critical questions: What are the structural and technological factors enabling such harmful content to spread? Why are current policies and regulations failing to curb these trends? And who must take responsibility—governments, tech companies, international bodies, or users themselves? As illustrated in case studies from Myanmar to Slovakia, disinformation and hate speech exploit societal divisions, algorithmic blind spots, and legal loopholes, resulting in real-world violence, political instability, and the erosion of public trust. These challenges are not just theoretical—they have tangible and devastating impacts, particularly on marginalized communities.

The task before this committee is clear: we must move beyond critique to solution-building. That means addressing the how—how to fix detection and moderation systems, how to enforce accountability, and how to strike a balance between safeguarding rights and maintaining free expression. Delegates are expected to propose realistic, enforceable mechanisms: improved AI-driven content detection, international standards for transparency and data ethics, stronger user protections, and inclusive policymaking that involves civil society. Your resolutions must be rooted in existing frameworks like Resolutions 74/154 and 75/282, but go further by identifying the gaps and proposing practical steps to close them. The time for passive observation is over—this is your opportunity to shape an international response that is as adaptive, inclusive, and resilient as the threats we face.

ALL THE BEST !